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Abstract
A path scheme for a simple game is composed of a path, i.e., a sequence of coalitions
that is formed during the coalition formation process and a scheme, i.e., a payoﬀ vector
for each coalition in the path. A path scheme is called population monotonic if a
player’s payoﬀ does not decrease as the path coalition grows. In this study, we focus
on Shapley path schemes of simple games in which for every path coalition the Shapley
value of the associated subgame provides the allocation at hand. We show that a simple
game allows for population monotonic Shapley path schemes if and only if the game is
balanced. Moreover, the Shapley path scheme of a speciﬁc path is population monotonic
if and only if the ﬁrst winning coalition that is formed along the path contains every
minimal winning coalition. Extensions of these results to other probabilistic values are
discussed.
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(H. Hamers).1 Introduction
In many real life contexts, ranging from the formation of pre/post-electoral coalitions of par-
ties to the formation of mergers and partnerships between ﬁrms, coalitions form through
a sequence of binding bilateral agreements. From among the numerous examples of such
coalition formation processes, we may single out the recent mergers between the banks and
between the consultancy ﬁrms that are observed in many countries and the Oslo agreements
between Israel and its neighbors. An important characteristic of such coalition formation
processes is the eﬀect of the sequence of agreements on the future potential agreements.
For a coalition formed through bilateral agreements may grow larger because the syn-
ergy/commitment obtained by a coalition may create new agreement opportunities which
are proﬁtable both for the members of the coalition and the agent which will join the coali-
tion. Hence, the determination of the sequences of binding bilateral agreements which will
result in the exploitation of the greatest possible amount of synergy is of both theoretical
and practical importance.
The coalition formation processes which end up with the formation of the grand coalition
deserve particular interest. Because, ﬁrst of all, in many situations (e.g., situations of
increasing returns to size), the grand coalition is the unique eﬃcient coalition structure.
Secondly, the formation of the grand coalition among agents which have common properties
(e.g., the formation of the grand coalition among leftist parties) has been the focal point of
many branches of social sciences.
In this study, we will focus on the formation of the grand coalition through binding
bilateral agreements in voting/government formation situations. We aim to address two
important questions in this context.
(i) Which voting situations allow for the formation of the grand coalition through binding
bilateral agreements?
(ii) In these situations, which agreement sequences must be followed to form the grand
coalition?
We will address these questions by modeling voting situations by simple transferable
utility cooperative games. In voting situations, the voters’ incentive to form coalitions
arises from their will to increase their power to aﬀect the outcome of the voting process.
Modelling of these situations as simple transferable utility games allows us to predict the
voters’ power to aﬀect the result of voting by using appropriate values for transferable
utility games. Many values have been oﬀered for simple games as appropriate measures of
voting power and the two most widely used ones are the Shapley-Shubik (1954) and Banzhaf
(1965) power indices. If we assume that each voter’s voting power is predicted by such an
1appropriate index, then the sequences of binding bilateral agreements which result in the
formation of the grand coalition boils down to the notion of population monotonic path
schemes. Postponing a precise deﬁnition to the next section, a population monotonic path
scheme for a simple game is composed of a path, i.e., a sequence of coalitions that is formed
during the coalition formation process and a scheme, i.e., a power index vector for each
coalition in the path such that each player’s index does not decrease as the path coalition
grows. In this study, we focus on the Shapley-Shubik power index as an appropriate measure
of voting power. Hence, the two questions that we address can be rephrased as
(i) Which simple games allow for population monotonic Shapley path schemes?
(ii) In these simple games, which paths have a population monotonic Shapley path
scheme?
It turns out that existence of veto players, i.e., a subgroup of voters whose unanimous
agreement is necessary to pass a decision, is required for the existence of population mono-
tonic Shapley path schemes and vice versa. Moreover, a Shapley path scheme is population
monotonic if and only if the ﬁrst winning coalition that is formed along the path contains
every minimal winning coalition of the game. We further show how to extend these results
to probabilistic values, generalizations of the Shapley value introduced by Weber (1988).
The notion of population monotonic (Shapley) path schemes is introduced by Cruijssen,
Borm, Fleuren and Hamers (2005). This study analyzes insinking (the antonym of outsourc-
ing) situations in logistics and the transportation sector. In these sectors, shippers often
outsource their transportation activities to a logistics service provider of their choice. Crui-
jssen et al. (2005) proposes an insinking procedure in which the logistics service provider
initiates the shift of logistics activities instead of waiting for the shippers to outsource their
activities. This procedure has the advantage that the logistics service provider can proac-
tively select a group of shippers with a strong synergy potential (like ordering dynamics,
locations etc.). Moreover, the gains resulting from this kind of cooperation can be allocated
to the participating shippers in a fair and sustainable way by means of customized tariﬀs.
Naturally, the attainment of gains in such situations requires the consent of the shippers.
Hence, to obtain the greatest possible amount of gains, the service provider has to ﬁnd an
eﬀective way of proposing oﬀers to shippers through which it can acquire the involvement
of each shipper. At this point, Cruijssen et al.(2005) proposes a sequence of binding bilat-
eral agreements arguing that compared to the simultaneous comprehensive agreements, by
following an appropriate sequence of binding bilateral agreements, the service provider can
attract new customers to the project by using the level of synergy and commitment already
attained in the sequence.
2The notion of population monotonic path schemes (PMPS) shares the same spirit with
the notion of population monotonic allocation schemes (PMAS) introduced and character-
ized by Sprumont (1990). A PMAS is an eﬃcient allocation scheme such that the payoﬀ of
any player does not decrease as the coalition he belongs grows larger. Hence, if the gains
associated with coalition formation are allocated with respect to a PMAS, the formation of
the grand coalition is guaranteed. In fact, the existence of a PMPS is a weaker condition for
a TU-game than the existence of a PMAS since every path scheme of a PMAS is population
monotonic. Nevertheless, if the coalitions are formed through binding bilateral agreements,
the grand coalition may still form when the gains associated with coalition formation are
allocated with respect to an allocation scheme which has a PMPS.
Our study in particular provides an alternative prediction of what kind of coalitions
form in voting situations which diﬀers from the mainstream prediction of Riker (1962).
Riker (1962) predicts that only minimal winning coalitions will form in equilibrium. This
idea has been the conclusion of many studies in the general coalition formation literature
based on the seminal noncooperative bargaining approach of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and
also the studies which analyze coalition formation in voting situations that are modeled by
simple TU-games like Shenoy (1979). However, the emprical data on government/coalition
formation shows that among all coalitions formed after the second world war in European
democracies only a third of them is minimal winning (Laver and Schoﬁeld, 1990). Our
current study shows that a wide spectrum of coalitions including the minimal winning ones
can form as a result of binding bilateral agreements providing an alternative point of view
for the analysis and the explanation of the data.
In a companion paper (C ¸ift¸ ci and Dimitrov, 2006), we study the stability of coalition
structures in hedonic coalition formation games in which players’ preferences over coalitions
are induced by the Shapley value of a simple game with veto control. It is shown that the
coalition structures which contain the union of minimal winning coalitions (or one of its
supersets) are strictly core stable in these hedonic coalition formation games. Hence, from
this aspect, the notion of population monotonic Shapley path schemes can be regarded as
a natural and decentralized coalition formation procedure which ensures the formation of a
stable coalition structure in simple games with veto control.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we will begin by introducing
the preliminaries about TU-games with particular attention to simple games and then we
will continue with a brief review of the seminal notion of the Shapley value. Section 2
also formally introduces population monotonic path schemes. Section 3 presents the main
results regarding the characterization of population monotonic Shapley path schemes of
3simple games. Section 4 discusses extensions of the results to other probabilistic values.
2 Preliminaries
Given a nonempty, ﬁnite set of players N, a transferable utility game (TU-game) with
player set N is a function v : 2N → R with v(∅) = 0. A coalition is a set of players S ⊂ N
and N is called the grand coalition. For any coalition S ⊂ N, v(S) is called the worth of
coalition S. We denote the set of TU-games with player set N by GN. A TU-game v ∈ GN
is monotonic if v(S) ≥ v(T) for every S,T ∈ 2N with T ⊂ S. A player i ∈ N is a null player
in v if v(S ∪{i}) = v(S) for every S ⊂ N\{i}. Given v ∈ GN and S ∈ 2N, the restriction of
v to S (a subgame of v) is denoted by v|S and is deﬁned by v|S(T) = v(T) for every T ⊂ S.
The core of a TU-game v ∈ GN is denoted by C(v) and is deﬁned as the set of eﬃcient
payoﬀ vectors for which no coalition has an incentive to split oﬀ from the grand coalition,
i.e., C(v) = {x ∈ RN|
P
i∈N xi = v(N) and
P
i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ 2N}. A TU-game
which has a nonempty core is called a balanced game.
A function F : GN → RN is called a value. A value F is eﬃcient if for all v ∈ GN,
P
i∈N Fi(v) = v(N). Let Π(N) denote the set of permutations on the player set N. F is
called anonymous if for all v ∈ GN and for any permutation π ∈ Π(N), F(π(v)) = π(F(v)).
Here, with v ∈ GN and π ∈ Π(N), π(v) ∈ GN is deﬁned by π(v)(S) = v(π(S)) for each
S ∈ 2N. F is said to satisfy the null player property if for any v ∈ GN and any null player
i ∈ N in v, Fi(v) = 0.
A TU-game v ∈ GN is called simple if v is monotonic, v(S) ∈ {0,1} for every S ∈ 2N
and v(N) = 1. We denote the set of simple TU-games with player set N by SN. Given
v ∈ SN, a coalition S ∈ 2N is called a winning coalition if v(S) = 1 and is called a losing
coalition if v(S) = 0. A winning coalition S is called minimal winning if there does not
exist a coalition T ( S which is winning. Every simple game v is characterized by its set of
minimal winning coalitions, MWC(v). A player i ∈ N is a veto player in v ∈ SN if S ⊂ N,
v(S) = 1 implies that i ∈ S. The set of veto players of v is denoted by veto(v). A simple
game v is balanced if and only if veto(v) 6= ∅ (Curiel, 1997, Theorem 1.10.6).
Voting or decision making situations in committees like parliaments can easily be mod-
eled into the framework of simple games by representing the coalitions which possesses the
necessary power to pass a decision as the winning coalitions of the game. This model en-
ables the employment of values for simple games to measure the parties’ power to eﬀect the
outcome of the voting situations at hand. Many values have been oﬀered for simple games
and studied in the literature as appropriate measures of decisional power, i.e., as power
4indices. We will shortly review the Shapley-Shubik (1954) power index that arises from the
Shapley value.
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is one of the most important solution concepts in
cooperative game theory and has been studied extensively. Given v ∈ GN, the Shapley




|S|!(|N| − |S| − 1)!
|N|!
(v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)).
Shapley and Shubik (1954) proposed to use the Shapley value as a power index for
voting situations in committees. For a simple game v ∈ SN the Shapley-Shubik index for




|S|!(|N| − |S| − 1)!
|N|!
. (1)
The value assigned to each voter can be interpreted by using the sequential probabilistic
interpretation of the Shapley value which stems from a procedure to form the grand coalition
(which is described also by Shapley (1953)) that yields the Shapley value of the game as
an expected payoﬀ of each player. In this procedure, the grand coalition N is formed by
introducing the players one by one and each player is assigned the marginal contribution
to the worth of the coalition formed when she joins the set of her predecessors. Hence,
the value assigned by Shapley-Shubik index is the probability of turning the coalition of
predecessors from losing to winning when the order of arrival of players is random and all
orders are equally likely. For further discussion of the importance of the Shapley value as an
estimator of political power and several examples of its applications, the reader is referred
to Straﬃn (1994) and Winter (2002).
We are now ready to introduce the notion of path schemes for TU-games.
Deﬁnition 2.1 Let v ∈ GN. A path consists of a sequence S = {S1,S2,...S|N|} of coalitions
such that |Sk| = k for all k ∈ {1,...,|N|} and Sm ⊂ Sm+1 for all m ∈ {1,...,|N| − 1}. A
path scheme (S,(xS)S∈S) for v consists of a path S and an allocation vector xS ∈ RS for
every coalition S ∈ S.
A path scheme (S,(xS)S∈S) for v ∈ GN is called population monotonic if it satisﬁes the
following conditions:
• xS
i ≥ v({i}) for all S ∈ S and i ∈ S. (individual rationality)
5• xS
i ≥ xT
i for every S,T ∈ S such that T ⊂ S and i ∈ T. (monotonicity)
Naturally, every value for TU-games deﬁnes a path scheme where the allocation for
every path coalition is obtained by applying the value to the restriction of the game to the
path coalition. A path scheme in which the Shapley value is used as allocation vector is
called a Shapley path scheme.
We will illustrate the notion of Shapley path schemes and their properties in the follow-
ing example.
Example 2.1 Let N = {1,2,3} and v ∈ SN be such that MWC(v) = {{1,2},{2,3}}.
The Shapley value of v and its subgames are provided in Table 1 below.
Coalition Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
{1} 0 - -
{2} - 0 -
















Table 1: The Shapley value of v and its subgames
It can easily be observed that this game has exactly two population monotonic Shapley
path schemes on paths {{1},{1,3},N} and {{3},{1,3},N}. 
3 Population Monotonic Shapley Path Schemes
We will begin with presenting a preliminary result which is useful in understanding the
structure of population monotonic Shapley path schemes of simple games.
Lemma 3.1 Given a simple game v ∈ SN, let S = {S1,S2,...,S|N|} be a path of coalitions
such that Sm = {i1,...,im} for every m ∈ {1,...,|N|}. Assume that the ﬁrst winning
coalition along the path S is Sk. If the Shapley path scheme of S is population monotonic,
then the following must hold:
(R1) Φim(v|Sp) = 0, for all m ∈ {k + 1,...,|N|} and for all p ∈ {m,...,|N|}.
(R2) Φi(v|Sk) = Φi(v|Sp), for all p ∈ {k + 1,...,|N|} and for all i ∈ Sk.
6(R1) and (R2) are direct consequences of the eﬃciency of the Shapley value and the
monotonicity property of the Shapley path scheme. Eﬃciency of the Shapley value implies
that the Shapley-Shubik power indices of the members of any winning coalition along a path
must add up to 1, the worth of the winning coalitions. Hence, once a winning coalition is
formed along a path, the population monotonicity requires two conditions to be met by the
Shapley path scheme. Firstly, the total decision power of one must continue to be shared
among the members of the ﬁrst winning coalition, i.e., all the subsequent players must have
a zero Shapley-Shubik index at every coalition that they are involved along the path (R1).
Secondly, the composition of the power among the members of the ﬁrst winning coalition
must stay constant along the rest of the path since an increase in one member’s power index
directly implies a decrease in one other member’s index (R2).
We are now ready to provide a characterization of the family of simple games which
allow population monotonic Shapley path schemes.
Theorem 3.1 Let v ∈ SN. Then v has a population monotonic Shapley path scheme if
and only if v is balanced.
Proof. Let v ∈ SN be a simple game which has a population monotonic Shapley path
scheme. Let (S,(Φ(v|S))S∈S) be a population monotonic Shapley path scheme for v such
that S = {S1,S2,...,S|N|} and Sm = {i1,...,im} for every m ∈ {1,...,|N|}. Assume that the
ﬁrst winning coalition along the path S is Sk; i.e., v(S1) = ... = v(Sk−1) = 0 and v(Sk) = 1.
Then, obviously ik ∈ veto(v|Sk). Now, consider v|Sk and v|Sk+1. Since v is monotonic, for
every winning coalition S ⊂ Sk, S ∪ {ik+1} is also winning. Then, if for a losing coalition
S ⊂ Sk, S∪{ik+1} is winning, it can easily be observed that Φik+1(v|Sk+1) is strictly positive
which contradicts with (R1). Hence, ik is also a veto player in v|Sk+1. Applying the same
reasoning recursively one ﬁnds that ik is a veto player of v, i.e., v is balanced.
Now, assume that v is balanced. Then, veto(v) 6= ∅. Let i ∈ veto(v). We will show
that the Shapley path scheme of any path S = {S1,S2,...,S|N|} with S|N|−1 = N\{i} is
a population monotonic Shapley path scheme. We know that S|N|−1 = N\{i} is a losing
coalition. Then vN\{i} is a null game and hence Φj(v|St) = 0 for all t ∈ {1,...,|N| − 1} and
j ∈ St. Also, since v is monotonic, Φj(v) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ N which implies that the Shapley
path scheme of S is population monotonic. 
Theorem 3.1 reveals that, in the class of simple games, the existence of veto players
is a must for the existence of population monotonic Shapley path schemes and vice versa.
We can interpret this result as follows. When a winning coalition is formed through a
7sequence of binding bilateral agreements, we know that the restriction of the TU-game to
this coalition has veto players, that is, in this winning coalition, there is a subgroup of
agents whose unanimous agreement/involvement is necessary to pass a decision. We also
know that the formation of the grand coalition starting from this winning coalition via
binding bilateral agreements requires the remaining players to be null players. But, this in
turn implies that the veto players of the winning coalition are in fact the veto players of
the whole game, i.e., the game is balanced.
The interpretation of Theorem 3.1 also brings out a useful hint for the characterization of
the paths of balanced simple games which has population monotonic Shapley path schemes.
If the veto players of the ﬁrst winning coalition along a path which has a population mono-
tonic Shapley path scheme are in fact the veto players of the whole game and if all the
subsequent players have to be null players, then a path can have a population monotonic
Shapley path scheme only when the ﬁrst winning coalition along this path includes all the
minimum winning coalitions of the game.
We will show in Theorem 3.2 that the hint stated above, i.e., the requirement that the
ﬁrst winning coalition along a path has to include all the minimum winning coalitions of the
game is both necessary and suﬃcient for a path to have a population monotonic Shapley
path scheme.
Theorem 3.2 Let v ∈ SN be a balanced simple game. A path S has a population monotonic
Shapley path scheme if and only if the ﬁrst winning coalition along S contains every minimal
winning coalition of v.
Proof. Let SM denote the union of minimal winning coalitions of v. Because v is balanced
we have that veto(v) 6= ∅.
We will ﬁrst show the only if part. Let S be a path of coalitions with Sm = {i1,...,im}
for every m ∈ {1,...,|N|}. Assume that S has a population monotonic Shapley path scheme
and the ﬁrst winning coalition along the path S is Sk (k ∈ {1,...,|N|}). If k = |N|, obviously
SN = N contains every minimal winning coalition. So assume that k ∈ {1,...,|N| −1} and
suppose Sk 6⊃ SM. Then there exists m ∈ {k + 1,...,|N|} such that Sm is the ﬁrst path
coalition that contains SM. Now, on the one hand (R1) implies that Φim(v|Sm) = 0. On
the other hand, im is a member of a minimal winning coalition S since Sm is the ﬁrst
path coalition that contains SM. Then, S\{im} is a losing coalition, i.e., v(S) = 1 and
v(S\{im}) = 0 implying that Φim(v|Sm) > 0, a contradiction. Thus, Sk ⊃ SM.
We will now prove the if part. Let S be a path of coalitions with Sm = {i1,...,im}
for every m ∈ {1,...,|N|}. Assume that the ﬁrst winning coalition along the path S is Sk
8(k ∈ {1,...,|N|}) and SM ⊂ Sk. Now, Φj(v|St) = 0 for all t ∈ {1,...,k − 1} and j ∈ St
since Sk−1 is a losing coalition. Also, Φi(v|Sk) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ Sk since v is monotonic.
Because each player im (m ∈ {k + 1,...,|N|}) is a null player since SM ⊂ Sk, we know
that Φim(v|Sp) = 0 for all m ∈ {k + 1,...,|N|} and for all p ∈ {m,...,|N|}. We will show
that Φi(v|Sk) = Φi(v|Sm) for all i ∈ Sk and for all m ∈ {k + 1,...,|N|} to conclude that the
Shapley path scheme of the path S is population monotonic.
Pick i ∈ Sk and t ∈ {k,...,|N| − 1}. We will show that Φi(v|St) = Φi(v|St+1).
Let A denote the collection {S ⊂ (St+1\{i})|v(S) = 0,v(S ∪{i}) = 1}, let B denote the
set {S ∈ A|it+1 6∈ S} and let C denote the set {S ∈ A|it+1 ∈ S}. Obviously A = B ∪ C.



























|S|!(t − |S| − 1)!
t!
= Φi(v|St)
where the ﬁrst and the last equalities follow from (1). Hence, we can conclude that the
Shapley path scheme of the path S is population monotonic. 
In the light of Theorem 3.2, we can answer one other important question in this context:
For which simple games all Shapley path schemes are population monotonic?
Theorem 3.3 Let v ∈ SN be a simple game. All Shapley path schemes of v are population
monotonic if and only if the set of veto players of v is a winning coalition.
Proof. If veto(v) is a winning coalition, it is the unique minimum winning coalition
and clearly every path scheme’s ﬁrst winning coalition contains SM = veto(v). Hence, by
Theorem 3.2 every Shapley path scheme is population monotonic. So, what remains to
prove is the only if part.
Assume that all Shapley path schemes of v are population monotonic but veto(v) is
losing. There exists a minimum winning coalition S = {i1,...,im} with m ∈ {1,...,|N|−1}.
9We know that Φi(v|S) = 1
m for every i ∈ S since S is a minimal winning coalition. Pick
a path of coalitions S = {S1,S2,...,S|N|} with Sm = S. The Shapley path scheme of S is
population monotonic by assumption. Consequently, Φi(v) = 1
m for every i ∈ S. Observe
that there exists i∗ ∈ S such that i∗ / ∈ veto(v) since S is a minimal winning coalition and
veto(v) is losing. Then, there exists another minimal winning coalition T ( N such that










|T| = T. Now, the Shapley
path scheme of S
0
is also population monotonic by assumption. Then, (R1) implies that
Φi∗(v) = 0 since i∗ / ∈ T, a contradiction with Φi∗(v) = 1
m as derived earlier. 
4 Extensions of the Results to Probabilistic Values
Probabilistic values, introduced and characterized by Weber (1988), are generalizations of
the Shapley value for ﬁnite TU-games. These values keep one essential feature of the Shapley
value, they assign each player an average of his marginal contributions. They, however, fail
to satisfy either the eﬃciency or anonymity property. In fact, the Shapley value is the
unique probabilistic value satisfying both anonymity and eﬃciency. Probabilistic values
can be classiﬁed into two groups: Quasi-values which are eﬃcient probabilistic values and
Semi-values, the probabilistic values which satisfy anonymity (see Weber (1988)). We refer
to Monderer and Samet (2002) for a detailed discussion of probabilistic values.
Probabilistic values are formally deﬁned as follows. Given N and i ∈ N, let Pi
N denote
the set of probability distributions on 2N\{i}, the family of coalitions not containing i. A
value F (deﬁned on GN) is called a probabilistic value (Weber, 1988) if for every v ∈ GN




pi(T)(v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T)), (2)
for some pi ∈ Pi
N for all i ∈ N. Here pi ∈ Pi
N can be interpreted as the player’s subjective
evaluation of the probability of joining diﬀerent coalitions. For example, the probabilistic





for all i ∈ N is the Shapley value.
In the following two subsections we will discuss the extensions of the results obtained
for the Shapley value on quasi-values and on semi-values, respectively.
104.1 Population Monotonic Path Schemes of Quasi-values
Let P(Π(N)) denote the set of probability distributions on the set of permutations of the
player set N. Given S ⊂ N and i ∈ S, we will denote by ΠS,i(N) the set
{τ ∈ Π(N)|τ(j) < τ(i) if and only if j ∈ S}.
The following characterization of quasi-values is provided by Weber (1988).
Theorem 4.1 (Weber (1988)) Let F be a probabilistic value as given in (2) deﬁned by
p = {pi}i∈N with pi ∈ Pi
N for every i ∈ N. Then F is a quasi-value if and only if there





for every i ∈ N and S ∈ 2N\{i}.
Observe that probabilistic values are originally deﬁned for a ﬁxed player set. However,
our analysis requires the values to be deﬁned on every subset of the player set under consid-
eration. Because, for every simple game, we want to be able to compare the payoﬀs assigned
by a value to the players at every subgame of the game.We now extend quasi-values in such
a way that the players’ subjective evaluation of the probability of joining diﬀerent coalitions
will be consistent in the sense deﬁned below. For this aim we will deﬁne the restrictions of
a probabilistic value to subgames.




i ∈ N. For each S ⊂ N, the restriction of F to GS is denoted by FS and for each player
i ∈ S, his restricted evaluations pi
S ∈ Pi







N(T ∪ T0), (4)
for all T ⊂ S\{i}.
We ﬁrst illustrate the notion of restrictions of a quasi-value in the following example.
Example 4.1 Let F be a probabilistic value on N = {1,2,3}. Assume that F is deﬁned




























11F satisﬁes (3) by taking the following probability distribution on the set of permutations






16, and b(321) = 4
16.
Hence F is a quasi-value.



















Notice that FS can be described via (3) by taking:
b(12) = 5
8 and b(21) = 3
8.
So also FS is a quasi-value on GS. 
In the previous example, we have shown that the speciﬁc restriction under consideration
is again a quasi-value. Indeed, every restriction of a quasi-value is a quasi-value for the
corresponding subgame as shown in the following proposition.




i ∈ N. Then, FS is a quasi-value for every S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅.




Take S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅. Given τ ∈ Π(N), τ|S denotes the restriction of τ to S, i.e., τ|S = π for
some π ∈ Π(S) with π(i) < π(j) if and only if τ(i) < τ(j), for all i,j ∈ S. We can induce




b(τ), for all π ∈ Π(S). (5)
Let FS be deﬁned by {pi






{τ ∈ Π(N)|τ|S = π} (6)
Notice that
Π(T∪T0),i(N) ∩ Π(T∪T00),i(N) = ∅ for every T0,T00 ⊂ N\S with T0 6= T00
and
























where the ﬁrst equality follows from (4) and the last but one equality follows from (6) and
the remarks below it. Then, Theorem 4.1 implies that FS is a quasi-value on GS. 
Having deﬁned the restrictions of a quasi-value, we can now illustrate the path schemes
associated with these values in the following example.
Example 4.2 Consider the quasi-value F deﬁned in Example 4.1 and let v ∈ SN with
N = {1,2,3} be deﬁned by MWC(v) = {{1,2},{2,3}}. From Table 2 it can easily be
observed that this balanced game has two population monotonic F-path schemes related to
the paths {{1},{1,3},N} and {{3},{1,3},N}. 
Coalition Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
{1} 0 - -
{2} - 0 -
















Table 2: The restrictions of F for v and its subgames in Example 4.2
The following theorem states that the results for population monotonic Shapley path
schemes in fact can be extended to quasi-values which are deﬁned by strictly positive sub-
jective evaluations of joining diﬀerent coalitions for each player.
13Theorem 4.2 Let F : GN → RN be a quasi-value deﬁned by {pi
N}i∈N with pi
N > 0 for all
i ∈ N. Then
(1) A simple game v ∈ SN has a population monotonic F-path scheme if and only if v
is balanced.
(2) Let v be balanced. Then a path S of v has a population monotonic F-path scheme if
and only if the ﬁrst winning coalition along S contains every minimal winning coalition of
v.
(3) All F-path schemes of v are population monotonic if and only if the set of veto
players of v is a winning coalition.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is similar to the proofs of Theorems 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, respec-
tively and is therefore omitted.
It is important at this point to observe that if for a quasi-value F, pi
N(S) = 0 for some
S ⊂ N, and i ∈ N\S, then an unbalanced simple game may have population monotonic
F-path schemes. This is illustrated in Example 4.3.


















Consider v ∈ SN deﬁned by MWC(v) = {{1,2},{1,3},{2,3}}. Clearly veto(v) = ∅. Then v
has population monotonic F-path schemes on the paths {{1},{1,2},N} and {{2},{1,2},N}
as can be seen in Table 3. 
Coalition Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
{1} 0 - -
{2} - 0 -
















Table 3: The restrictions of F for v and its subgames in Example 4.3
144.2 Population Monotonic Path Schemes of Semi-values
In this section, we will focus on one particular, well-known semi-value, the Banzhaf value





2|N|−1 (v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)).
It can easily be observed that the Banzhaf value is deﬁned for every ﬁnite player set, and
in particular also for all subgames of a speciﬁc game. In fact, every semi-value is deﬁned
for every ﬁnite player set, and hence for all subgames of a speciﬁc game. Moreover, the
restriction of a semi-value obtained by using the consistency condition (4) boils down to
the deﬁnition of the same semi-value for the corresponding subgame. This can be readily
veriﬁed from the characterization of semi-values on TU-games with ﬁnite support provided
by Dubey et al. (1981).
For population monotonic Banzhaf path schemes the situation essentially diﬀers from
the population monotonic Shapley path schemes. This is illustrated in examples 4.4 and 4.5.
Example 4.4 Let N = {1,2,3} and v ∈ SN be deﬁned by MWC(v) = {{1,2},{1,3},{2,3}}.
The Banzhaf value of v and its subgames are provided in the table below.
Coalition Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
{1} 0 - -
{2} - 0 -


















Table 4: The Banzhaf value of v and its subgames in Example 4.4
Notice that v is not balanced since veto(v) = ∅ but that every Banzhaf path scheme of
v is population monotonic. 
Example 4.5 Let N = {1,2,3,4} and consider the simple game v ∈ SN deﬁned by
MWC(v) = {{1,2,3},{1,2,4},{1,3,4}}. Clearly, v is balanced. The Banzhaf value of
15v and its subgames are provided in Table 5. The Banzhaf values of the subgames corre-
sponding to losing coalitions are omitted. Then, every Banzhaf path scheme is population

























Table 5: The Banzhaf value of v and its subgames in Example 4.5
monotonic although the set of veto players of v is a losing coalition. Secondly, there are
path schemes of v, like the one related to path {{1},{1,2},{1,2,3},{1,2,3,4}}, which are
population monotonic but the ﬁrst winning coalition along these paths does not contain the
union of minimal winning coalitions v. 
The results for population monotonic Shapley path schemes can be extended only partly
to the Banzhaf value. This is reﬂected in Theorem 4.3.
Theorem 4.3 Let v ∈ SN be balanced.
(1) If the ﬁrst winning coalition along a path S contains every minimal winning coalition
of v, then the path scheme of S has a population monotonic Banzhaf-path scheme.
(2) If the set of veto players of v is a winning coalition, then all Banzhaf-path schemes
of v are population monotonic.
The proof of Theorem 4.3 is similar to the corresponding parts of the proofs of Theorems
3.2 and 3.3, respectively and is therefore omitted.
By making use of the characterization of semi-values provided by Dubey et al. (1981),
one can show that Theorem 4.3 can be extended to every semi-value.
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